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Australia’s- HECS Policy – Fewer Social But More Political Barriers 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
This paper is one of a series that has empirically tested the proposition that whilst the 
Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) was implemented with the intention of 
improving access to university education for all Australians, it has had unexpected and 
unwanted consequences for governance more generally, particularly of the tax system. 
We use data from the “Graduates’ Hopes, Visions and Actions Survey” based on a 
sample of 447 Australian graduates who recently completed their tertiary education. 
Findings suggest that while HECS policy appears to have met its objective of enabling 
less privileged groups to obtain a university degree, it has also given rise to resistance to 
the policy, to paying back the loan and tax evasion. This research demonstrates the 
dangers of implementing higher education policy in a way that dissociates the economic 
aspects of policy from the social and community attitudes in which it is inevitably 
embedded.  
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Australia’s HECS Policy – Fewer Social But More Political Barriers 
 
 
Introduction 
Student financing has a controversial place on the political agenda in many countries in 
the world including Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Norway, Canada, and the 
Netherlands (see Annual Report: Student Loan Scheme, 2003; Association of 
Universities and Colleges of Canada, 1999; Financial Times, 4 February 2003; Johnstone, 
2003; Marginson, 1997; Vossensteyn, 1999). In an OECD comparative study, it was 
revealed that Australia, New Zealand and Norway are the only OECD countries with 
declining public investment in universities (Larkins, 2003). As a result, a larger share of 
the costs of higher education has been shifted to students and their families. Although the 
student loan system in Australia has provided considerable assistance and support to 
eligible students, it has also created risks for the students themselves, and for governance 
more generally.  
The current paper has a specific focus on the Australian student loan program – that is the 
Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS). Tertiary student financing in Australia 
has become a particularly vigorously and passionately debated topic since the 
introduction of the Scheme in 1989. Sixteen years on, while some argue convincingly for 
its economic credentials (e.g., Chapman & Ryan, 2002), the scheme continues to be 
unpopular (e.g., Lawrence, 2004) and has provoked heated discussion about the notion of 
tertiary education as a public good (Aungles, Buchanan, Karmel, & MacLachlan, 2002; 
Phillips, Cooper, Eccles, Lampard, Noblette, & Wade, 2003).  
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In this paper, we contend that, although HECS policy may have been implemented with 
the genuine intention of improving access to a university education within a user-pays 
system, there have been unexpected consequences detrimental to our system of 
governance. At the micro level, the scheme is producing individuals who are less willing 
to engage cooperatively with government, in particular, with Australia’s self-assessment 
tax system. The primary aim of this paper is to show that these attributes are more likely 
to characterize those who have taken out a HECS loan and delayed payment for their 
university education than those who have paid up-front. Moreover, there is no evidence 
that the relatively harsher attitudes to HECS and tax among the loan group are directly 
attributable to socio-economic background, suggesting that such negativity may be a by-
product of HECS policy itself. 
 
Background 
The fundamental aim of HECS was to ensure that all Australians regardless of social 
background and family income had the opportunity to attend an institution of tertiary 
education. Under HECS, students can choose to pay their contribution upfront or defer it. 
The Commonwealth provides a 25% discount1 to eligible students who pay upfront. 
Students who choose to defer payment take out a loan with the Commonwealth 
government and are required to repay that loan when their income exceeds the minimum 
threshold for compulsory repayment. At the time of this research, the threshold was 
$21,983 a year although the threshold has risen to 35,000 in 2004-05. Repayments are 
administered by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) that is legally responsible for 
                                                 
1 From 2005, the discount rate for upfront payment is 20%. 
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collecting the balance of the outstanding loan from graduates through the taxation 
system. 
Since the introduction of HECS, concern has increased as to whether the scheme fulfils 
the hopes and aspirations of Australian citizens. For example, HECS debt has caused 
students to defer other investment decisions (e.g., family commitments, house purchase, 
business investments) and to engage in increased paid outside work during semester 
(Larkins, 2003). A recent report has revealed that 20% of HECS loans (estimated to 
amount to A$2.8 billion in 2004) are unlikely to be repaid (The Australian, 13 November 
2004; The Sydney Morning Herald, 1 April 2003) which poses a challenge for the ATO. 
It has been stated that the doubtful student debt has increased by over 230% from 1996 to 
2003 (The Weekend Australian, 21-22 Feb, 2004). An even more alarming aspect of 
HECS is diminished morale in relation to repaying the HECS debt, which in turn, 
impedes tax morale (Braithwaite & Ahmed, in press). Bearing a HECS debt has also been 
found to be a risk factor in relation to tax compliance (e.g., Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2004, 
in press). These studies have demonstrated that tax evasion is greater among those 
graduates who carry a HECS debt for their higher education.  
The studies that have linked HECS loans with tax evasion have relied on qualitative 
interviews and path models that have implicated attitudes to HECS, university, loan 
repayment, and deterrence provisions as additional causal agents (see Ahmed & 
Braithwaite, 2004, in press). Basic demographic variables have been controlled in these 
models, but nowhere has the explicit question been raised about the intersection of the 
demographic and the attitudinal predictors. At a time in Australia when public debate is 
giving credence to “the politics of envy” (Hughes, 2001), an important question to 
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answer is do negative attitudes towards HECS and taxation reflect the social discourse of 
demographic groups who feel that they have had fewer opportunities than others or do 
they signal unease about the direction in which the democracy is heading? If graduates 
who carry a HECS debt are demographically distinctive in that they come from less 
privileged groups than graduates who pay up-front fees, and if these demographic 
differences dominate the attitudinal differences that have been observed in earlier studies, 
some support might be claimed for “the politics of envy” argument. If, however, the 
attitudinal variables remain important in discriminating those with HECS loans and those 
who have paid upfront fees, after demographic markers of disadvantage and privilege 
have been considered, it is more likely that the implementation of the HECS scheme 
itself has been responsible for alienating a significant proportion of Australian graduates 
from the tax system and from meeting their civic responsibilities. 
 
The present study 
Two groups (loan group and upfront payment group) were compared in terms of (a) 
socio-demographic background (8 variables), (b) educational experiences (4 variables), 
(c) attitudes towards HECS policy (4 variables), and (d) taxpaying behaviour (1 variable). 
First, a comparison is made of graduates who deferred payment and those who did not on 
each of these variables. Subsequently, a multivariate analysis is used to find out which of 
these variables are most important in discriminating the two groups. Do socio-
demographic variables reflecting low opportunity dominate the other variables, or does 
the loan group continue to manifest negative attitudes and behaviour toward government 
instrumentalities even after demographic differences have been controlled?  
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Hypothesized socio-demographic profile of those with a HECS loan 
In theory, graduates who take out a HECS loan should come from socio-demographic 
groups which traditionally have had less opportunity to attend university or who have 
difficulty meeting the costs of a tertiary education. Indicators of concern about costs 
might include choice of university course (undertaking cheaper courses (Band 1 and 
Band 2) rather than the more expensive Band 3 courses) and acknowledgement that cost 
was a salient factor in choosing a particular course at a particular university. A number of 
studies have shown that university enrolment patterns are increasingly being affected by 
the anticipated HECS debt especially among disadvantaged students (see Aungles et al., 
2002; Phillips et al., 2003).  
Also relevant are likely to be age, gender and work experience, albeit in complex ways. 
While age is likely to mean that the opportunity to save money to meet the costs of a 
university education is greater, there might also be constraints on how one’s savings are 
spent, perhaps due to meeting family responsibilities. Similarly, having spent time in the 
workforce provides economic opportunity to pursue tertiary education, but going to 
university might be a distraction from gaining advancement in one’s career, which in 
turn, puts economic well-being at risk. With regard to gender, ambiguities also are 
present as to who is privileged and who is not. The pay gap between men and women 
might be considered a discouragement against women going to university, unless tertiary 
education is seen as a way in which women will gain the competitive edge in the 
workforce. On all three dimensions of age, work experience and gender, the hypothesized 
relationships are that those who are best positioned financially will be more likely to pay 
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upfront fees, and those who are least well off financially will take out a HECS loan. In 
other words, those who are young, who have little work experience and who are women 
will be more likely to be relatively economically disadvantaged and take out a HECS 
loan. 
In addition to being young, female, with little work experience and with concerns about 
the cost of a university education, income after graduation was considered a relevant 
variable. Lower than expected income could explain negative attitudes among those who 
had taken out a HECS loan. For this reason, current income needed to be controlled as 
well as the socio-demographic indicators that might be expected to make it difficult for 
individuals to pursue tertiary studies.  
Finally, controls were introduced for part-time study and for being self-employed. Part-
time students are known to be more likely to pay upfront (Long & Hayden, 2001) 
presumably because they have disposable income as a result of holding down full-time 
jobs while they study. Those who are self-employed have different loan repayment 
arrangements from employees. The self-employed are responsible for setting money 
aside for their loan repayments while employees have their HECS loan repayment 
automatically deducted from their salary by their employer along with their income tax.  
 
Negative attitudinal variables and tax evasion 
Our own previous research suggests that graduates with a HECS debt value educational 
attainment differently, and demand more in terms of educational outcomes and 
experiences. Findings from a pilot study (Ahmed, 2000) revealed strong feelings of 
resentment about carrying a HECS debt when students felt they were not getting value for 
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money from their university course. There is some evidence, however, that dissatisfaction 
is not confined to those who carry a HECS debt. More recent studies have demonstrated 
that course dissatisfaction weakens the sense of moral obligation to pay HECS 
(Braithwaite & Ahmed, in press) and increases the propensity to evade tax regardless of 
whether or not graduates bear a HECS debt (Ahmed & Braithwaite, in press). Level of 
course satisfaction is critically important to the tertiary sector at a time when competition 
for student enrolments is rife. It should also be of enormous concern to government if 
willingness to be a good citizen is compromised by dissatisfaction with tertiary education 
standards. Compounding these problems for both the university and government sectors 
is the possibility that HECS loans are generating dissatisfaction rather than appreciation 
for the opportunity to have a tertiary education. Course satisfaction in the current study is 
operationalized as graduates’ satisfaction with the benefits they received from their 
courses, specifically (i) quality teaching, (ii) professional development, (iii) clear course-
goals, and (iv) skill acquisition.  
A second set of hypotheses tested is that graduates carrying a HECS debt are more likely 
to view HECS as an unfair policy and have a lower internalized obligation to repay the 
loan. HECS loans are designed to attract those who are having financial difficulties, but 
they are also likely to be associated with ideological preferences  about who should 
support the universities. Paying upfront is consistent with a user-pays approach to the use 
of resources, while HECS loans are likely to prove more attractive to those who hold to 
the view that tertiary education is a public good which the government should provide 
and make available to all. Criticism of HECS and less obligation to repay the loan may be 
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signs of political resistance that are more common among those who have a HECS debt 
than amongst those who have paid upfront fees. 
Previous work has shown that those with a HECS debt are more likely to cheat on their 
tax, a finding that has remained significant even after controlling for age, income, 
satisfaction with tertiary studies and opposition to HECS policy (Ahmed & Braithwaite, 
2004; in press). One possibility is that tax evasion is a way of recouping monetary losses 
as a result of HECS repayments, an argument that becomes increasingly plausible given 
that the agent handling HECS debts and repayments is the Australian Taxation Office 
(ATO). The ATO has the responsibility for collecting HECS debts from students. The 
ATO also has the data with which to calculate the value of the debt and to monitor the 
levels of compliance with debt repayment obligations. Students disclose that they are 
carrying a HECS debt to their employers, who are required by the ATO to deduct a 
specified amount of repayment at source along with personal income tax.2 Possibly 
graduates who carry a debt develop an antagonistic relationship with the ATO because 
they view the ATO not only as the HECS debt record keeper, but also as the “oppressive” 
debt collector.  
In the next section we outline the method used to examine the extent to which those with 
a HECS debt and those who have paid their fees upfront hold different attitudes to 
university, government policy and taxpaying, as well as the extent to which expected 
differences in attitudes and actions can be discounted because they are attributable to 
socio-demographic background variables, in particular, economic well-being. 
  
                                                 
2 Self-employed graduates communicate directly with the ATO. 
 11
Method 
Participants  
The data used in this paper were collected from 447 Australian graduates who completed 
the Graduates’ Hopes, Visions and Actions Survey3 (GHVA Survey). New graduates 
whose degree was conferred in either 1998 or 1999 were selected for this study as they 
were expected to have started employment by the time the survey was mailed out. The 
sample was stratified in terms of students graduating from each discipline in two 
universities in the Australian Capital Territory.  
Of the 1500 questionnaires distributed, 447 were returned after several reminders, giving 
a response rate of 33% (after excluding undelivered questionnaires). While low in 
absolute terms, this response rate is comparable with rates reported for other tax-based 
surveys (Braithwaite, 2001; Pope, Fayle, & Chen, 1993; Kirchler, 1999; Wallschutzky, 
1996; Webley, Adams, & Elffers, 2002)4.  
 
Procedure 
The participants were initially sent an introductory letter about the survey that guaranteed 
strict confidentiality of responses. The letter explained that the purpose of the survey was 
to gain an understanding of how graduates viewed the HECS, how they felt about their 
tertiary education experiences, and how they would describe their taxpaying behaviour.  
                                                 
3 http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/UP.Ahmed.HECSquest.pdf  
 
4 Wallschutzky (1996) has argued that tax surveys of the general population cannot be expected to yield a 
response rate higher than 30-40%. 
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After one week, the survey questionnaire was mailed out along with an accompanying 
letter and a postage-paid return envelope. The accompanying letter re-emphasized the 
research purpose, re-iterated the guarantee of respondent anonymity, and encouraged 
respondents to return the completed questionnaire in a sealed envelope. A two-week 
return date was requested. An identification number appeared in the questionnaire to 
allow follow-up reminders of non-respondents asking them to complete and mail the 
survey if they had not already done so. As recommended by Dillman (1991), a reminder 
postcard was sent out one week after the initial mailing. Three weeks later, an identical 
packet was sent out to those participants who had not returned the questionnaire. 
 
Measures 
The GHVA Survey was based largely on the Community Hopes, Fears, and Actions 
Survey (Braithwaite, 2001) with some additional items included to assess perception of 
the desirability and practicability of HECS, and an evaluation of university courses. 
Details about the measures used to empirically answer the research questions posed in 
this paper are provided below.  
Having a HECS liability: This was assessed using a single item: “Do you have a HECS 
debt?” (yes = 1, no = 2; reverse coded for analyses). Of the total sample, 65% had a 
HECS debt and 35% had paid their tuition fees upfront. This survey seems to over-
represent those who had paid upfront fees when compared with the 26% who had done so 
in Kim’s study (1997). Of those who claimed to have paid upfront, 67% made the full 
payment whereas 33% chose the partial upfront payment option. Of those who had paid 
upfront, 65% reported that they were self-funding, 25% that their parents paid for them, 
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and 10% that employers paid for them. Readers should be cautious in interpreting these 
figures because the categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, in theory, a 
respondent’s upfront payment can be made by parents at first, then by the student, and 
finally by the employer.  
Socio-demographic variables: Eight socio-demographic variables were used in this 
study which are described below. 
Age and gender: Respondents’ age was measured in years (Mean = 31.39 years; SD = 
9.84). Gender was scored 1 for male (41%) and 2 for female (59%). 
Length of working years: Respondents were asked a single question: How long have you 
been working? Most respondents had been working for for more than 2 years (27% for 1-
2 years, 24% for 2-3 years, 39% for more than 3 years, only 10% had been working for 
less than a year). 
Cost salience: To assess the salience of the cost of university courses for respondents, the 
following two questions were asked: Did your financial circumstances influence your (a) 
choice of course? And (b) choice of university? (yes = 1, no = 2). Responses to these two 
items were reverse scored so that a higher score indicates cost was a relevant issue 
influencing students’ enrolment including their choice of course and university.  
To form the index of cost salience, respondents were grouped as perceiving financial 
burden if they had answered “yes” to any one of the above questions. Thirty-four percent of 
the respondents reported that their financial circumstances adversely affected their choice 
of enrolment in some way.  
Field of study: Field of study at the undergraduate level was assessed through respondents’ 
selecting one of the following broad disciplines: 1 = Arts, education, nursing; 2 = Science, 
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engineering, agriculture, architecture, business/economics; 3 = Law, medicine, veterinary 
science; 4 = Combined degree; 5 = Other. Courses described under 5 were recoded into the 
other categories. For analytical purposes, less expensive courses (Band 1 and Band 2) were 
collapsed, as were more expensive courses (Band 3 and combined degree), to form a new 
variable with 2 categories. A less expensive course was undertaken by 76% of graduates. 
Modes of study: Respondents were asked a single question: What was your type of 
attendance for the tertiary course? (1 = wholly or mainly full-time, 2 = wholly or mainly 
part-time). Most participants (71%) reported being a full-time student. 
Personal income: Personal income was measured in Australian dollars per year. 
Respondents were asked to tick the income range to which they belonged: (a) less than 
$20,000 (covered 8.7% of the sample); (b) $20,001 - 30,000 (covered 9.7% of the 
sample); (c) $30,001 - $50,000 (covered 55.8% of the sample; (d) $50,001 - $75,000 
(covered 20.3% of the sample); (e) $75,001 - $100,000 (covered 3.4% of the sample); 
and (f) more than $100,000 (covered 2.2% of the sample). To reduce skewness in the 
scale, two response categories (“$75,001 - $100,000” and “more than $100,000”) were 
collapsed into one category for the analyses that follow.  
Work sector: Work sector was measured by respondents selecting one of the following 
categories that best described the type of work they did: (a) government sector, (b) 
private sector, (c) business, (d) educational institutions, (e) self-employed, and (f) other. 
For the present purpose, respondents were grouped into 3 categories: first, those working 
in the non-profit (government sector or educational) institutions (63%); second, those 
working in the private sector (27%), and third, those in their own businesses or self-
employed (10%).  
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Course satisfaction variables: The majority of items used to measure graduates’ course 
satisfaction were adapted from the Graduate Experience Questionnaire (Long & Hillman, 
2000).  
Seventeen items comprising the measure covered four aspects of the university 
experience: (a) quality teaching (4 items; a sample item: “My lecturers were extremely 
good at explaining things”; M = 3.62; SD = 1.06; alpha = .89); (b) professional 
development5 (7 items; a sample item: “The course helped me to grow professionally”; M 
= 4.17; SD = .92; alpha = .86); (c) clear course goals (2 items; a sample item: “It was 
often hard to discover what was expected of me in this course” (reverse coded); M = 
3.73; SD = 1.09; alpha = .68), and (d) skill acquisition (4 items; a sample item: “The 
course helped me develop the ability to plan my own work”; M = 4.62; SD = .79; alpha = 
.81). 
There were six response categories for all items in this measure: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 
= disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = agree, 6 = strongly agree (see 
Appendix for full listing of items).  
HECS related variables: Four variables were used to gather graduates’ views on HECS 
policy and their likely reaction should they be caught for not repaying the HECS loan by 
the ATO.  
Perception of HECS as an unfair scheme: This scale comprised three items measuring the 
extent to which graduates regarded HECS policy as unfair and discriminatory: (a) 
“Recently6, the threshold level for compulsory payment of a HECS debt was lowered” – 
this is unfair; (b) “Differential rates of HECS apply to commencing students depending 
                                                 
5 This aspect was developed for the present study. 
6 Note that the survey was conducted in 2000.  
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upon the type of course (e.g. medicine, science) undertaken” – this is unfair; and (c) 
“Students who pay upfront are eligible to have a 25 percent discount rate” – this is unfair. 
There were six response categories: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = slightly 
disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = agree, 6 = strongly agree (M = 3.72; SD = 1.24; alpha = 
.65).  
Perceived deterrence if not repaying HECS loan: Perceived deterrence was measured by 
combining responses to questions about (a) the probability of being caught, (b) the 
probability of receiving sanctions, and (c) the probability of seriousness of the 
consequences (see Braithwaite & Makkai, 1991; Varma & Doob, 1998) in the following 
scenario:  
“Imagine that you chose to defer payment of your HECS debt and you are now required 
to repay the debt through the taxation system. You DO NOT repay the debt” 
Each respondent received a deterrence score calculated by multiplying (a), (b) and (c) 
(see Appendix for details). Scores across the sample produced a mean of 56.98 and SD of 
26.52.  
Feelings of shame in relation to not repaying HECS loan: A scenario-based self-report  
questionnaire, Management Of Shame State – Shame Acknowledgment and Shame 
Displacement (MOSS-SASD (Version II); see Ahmed, 2005), was used to measure 
shame acknowledgment and shame displacement. Respondents were asked to imagine 
that they had been caught for not repaying their HECS debt as in the scenario above. 
They were then asked: “Assume that you now have to pay a substantial fine or penalty. 
How likely is it that the following would occur?” 
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Respondents then rated a list of shame related reactions (see Appendix) in terms of their 
relevance to them using four categories: 1 = not likely, 2 = may happen, 3 = likely, 4 = 
almost certain.  
The shame acknowledgment scale measured the degree to which an individual responded 
to conscience in the sense that the person acknowledged wrongdoing, felt guilt and 
wanted to make amends (11 items; a sample item: “feel ashamed of myself”; M = 2.54, 
SD = .89, alpha = .95). 
The shame displacement scale measured the tendency to blame and hit out at others 
when caught for evading HECS payments and making excuses for what had gone 
wrong (5 items; a sample item: “feel angry with the Tax Office”; M = 1.77, SD = 
.71, alpha = .82). 
Tax evasion: The tax evasion index measured the extent to which respondents admitted 
to having engaged in act(s) of tax non-compliance. This measure of tax evasion aimed to 
capture transgressions that had already occurred rather than proneness or openness to tax 
evasion.   
Three measures were used to develop the behavioural index of tax evasion. To form the 
index of tax evasion, respondents were grouped as evaders if they had evaded tax in any 
one of the following ways: 
(1) “How much of your income in the 1999-2000 financial year did you get paid in 
untaxed cash?” (i.e. notes and coins rather than cheque or directly deposited into a 
bank account) (less than 5% = 1, between 5 and 20% = 2, between 20 and 50% = 
3, more than 50% = 4, did not get paid any untaxed cash = 5) 
and 
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 “How much of your untaxed cash income did you declare on your 1999-2000 
 income tax return?” (none = 1 through all = 10); or 
(2) “As far as you know, did you exaggerate the amount of deductions or rebates in 
your 1999-2000 income tax return?” ( a lot = 1, quite a lot = 2, somewhat = 3, a 
little = 4, not at all = 5); or 
(3) “As far as you know, did you report all the money you earned in your 1999-2000 
income tax return?” (yes = 1, no = 2). 
Respondents who indicated that they were totally compliant on all of these 3 indicators 
were assigned to the non-evader group. Thus, tax evasion was scored as 1 if non-
compliant on at least one indicator and 0 if compliant on all three indicators. This method 
was used because this is a relatively inexperienced group of taxpayers most of whom 
would have had limited opportunity to evade tax in a range of different ways. Thus, if 
they had tried just one, they were included in the evading group. 
 
Results 
Data Analyses 
The data analyses were performed in two steps. First, for the loan group and upfront 
payment group, means were compared using independent t-tests, or where more 
appropriate, frequency breakdowns for the two groups were compared using chi-square 
tests of independence. The specific aim of these analyses was to examine the extent to 
which graduates with a HECS debt (loan group) differed from those who paid upfront 
(upfront payment group) for their tertiary education at the bivariate level of analysis. 
Comparisons were made in terms of the above mentioned socio-demographic indicators, 
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university course satisfaction, HECS related variables, and tax evasion. The results are 
reported in Table 1.  
The second step involved a multivariate procedure – hierarchical logistic regression 
analysis. This analysis was used to examine whether attitudinal and behavioural variables 
can distinguish the loan group from the upfront payment group above and beyond the 
socio-demographic variables and university course satisfaction variables. Results are 
reported in Table 2. 
Findings in relation to socio-demographic variables: Graduates deferring payments (in 
the loan group) tended to be younger, were more likely to be women, and reported being 
constrained by financial considerations when they chose their course and university. The 
loan group had had less work experience than the upfront payment group and they were 
more likely to be full-time students. These findings support the central hypothesis that 
HECS loans are more likely to be taken out by students whose capacity to pay upfront 
fees is relatively low. These are the students for whom HECS was designed. These data 
suggest that the HECS program is effective in so far as it supports those who might be 
excluded from full-time university study because of their financial circumstances. 
In addition, loans were more common among those students who enrolled in a less 
expensive course (e.g., Band 1 and Band 2). Interestingly, students who took out a HECS 
loan were earning less after graduation than the upfront payment group. The explanation 
for this difference, however, is likely to be complicated by the fact that women earn less 
than men on graduation and more women took out a HECS loan than men (Ahmed, 2004; 
Reiman, 2001). Furthermore, the upfront payment group had more work experience, and 
therefore, are likely to be further advanced in their careers than the loan group.  
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Table 1. Mean comparison (standard deviation in parenthesis) with independent t-test 
values of all variables between loan group (n = 289) and upfront payment group (n = 157)  
VARIABLES 
 
Loan group Upfront 
payment group 
t-value 
Socio-demographic variables    
Age 28.61 (7.96) 36.45 (10.88) 8.55*** 
Personal income 2.81 (.87) 3.46 (.91) 7.17*** 
Length of working years 2.60 (.96) 3.47 (.91) 8.99*** 
Course satisfaction variables    
Quality teaching 3.51 (1.06) 3.82 (1.03) 3.02** 
Professional development 4.10 (.97) 4.30 (.80) 2.20** 
Clear course-goals 3.63 (1.12) 3.91 (1.01) 2.60** 
Skill acquisition 4.85 (.81) 4.75 (.83) -1.17 (ns) 
HECS related variables    
Perception of HECS as an unfair policy 3.99 (1.20) 3.23 (1.18) -6.40*** 
Shame acknowledgment if not repaying HECS 2.47 (.89) 2.65 (.88) 2.01* 
Shame displacement if not repaying HECS 1.81 (.72) 1.70 (.69) -1.53 (ns) 
Perceived deterrence if not repaying HECS 59.52 (25.97) 52.39 (27.00) -2.65** 
Chi-square test of independence (categorical variables) % % χ2 
Gender:    Male 
  Female 
38 
62 
48 
52 
4.01* (df = 
1) 
Field of study:   Band 1+2 
  Band 3 + Combined 
82 
18 
 
72 
28 
 
4.51* (df = 
1) 
Mode of study:   Full-time 
  Part-time 
87 
13 
44 
56 
88.47***    
(df = 1) 
Cost Salience  Cost not Relevant 
 Cost Relevant 
61 
39 
74 
26 7.38**(df=1) 
Work status:   Non-profit organization 
 Private Organisation 
 Self-employed 
62 
28 
10 
66 
24 
10 
.81 (ns) 
Tax Evasion No  
 Yes 
75 
25 
88 
12 9.23**(df=1) 
* < .05,  ** < .01, ***  < .001 
 
No significant differences between groups were found in terms of being self-employed, 
or working for an employer in the private, non-profit or public sector. 
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Findings in relation to course satisfaction variables: As can be seen from Table 1, 
graduates who had taken out a HECS loan were less satisfied with the quality of teaching 
in terms of the staff’s ability to explain the subject, to motivate students, and to provide 
helpful feedback on progress.  They also were more critical of the clarity of course goals 
and standards, and expressed more dissatisfaction with the professional development that 
they accomplished through their studies. Interestingly, the loan group was no different 
from the upfront payment group in terms of the skills saw themselves as acquiring 
through their tertiary education. 
Findings in relation to HECS related variables: Respondents’ attitudes towards HECS as 
a social policy were different for the loan and upfront payment group. Graduates who 
carried a HECS debt were more likely to perceive HECS as an unfair policy than those 
who did not. When presented with a scenario of not repaying a HECS loan and being 
caught by the authorities, the loan group expressed less remorse as well as less 
acknowledgment of shame and responsibility. No significant differences were found on 
the tendency to blame others, however, in the scenario situation. 
The question about deterrence produced an interesting finding. Graduates with a HECS 
debt were more likely to fear deterrence should they be caught. They did not regard the 
Tax Office as complacent in chasing up HECS debts. 
Findings in relation to tax evasion: From Table 1, the loan group, compared to the 
upfront payment group, was more likely to engage in tax evasion in terms of 
exaggerating deductions and/or under-reporting cash earnings. 
Hierarchical logistic regression analysis  
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In the previous section, 14 variables appear to significantly distinguish graduates who are 
carrying a HECS debt from those who are not. The purpose of the hierarchical logistic 
regression analysis is to examine the contribution of attitudinal and behavioural variables 
(e.g., perception of HECS as an unfair policy, tax evasion) above and beyond the effects 
of socio-demographic variables (e.g., gender, age, income) and course satisfaction 
variables. It should be noted that this analysis uses only the variables which appeared to 
highlight important differences between the two groups of graduates in t-tests and cross-
tabulations. 
Table 2. Unstandardized coefficients (B) (Wald statistics in parenthesis) for the 
hierarchical logistic regression analysis in explaining important variables in 
differentiating loan group from upfront group  
Independent variables First step Second step Final step  
Gender .29 (1.34) .31 (1.55) .47 (2.99) 
Age -.03 (4.71*) -.03 (4.53*) -.05 (7.56**) 
Personal income -.58 (15.01***) -.57 (14.36***) -.46 (8.21**) 
Length of working years -.48 (10.34***) -.47 (10.13***) -.51 (10.32***) 
Cost salience .47 (3.10) .44 (2.70) .35 (1.49) 
Field of study .20 (.43) .15 (.24) .12 (.14) 
Modes of study -1.03 (10.44***) -1.08 (11.22***) -1.11 (9.90**) 
University course satisfaction experience na -.24 (2.24) -.06 (.13) 
Perception of HECS as an unfair scheme na na .52 (20.05***) 
Perceived deterrence na na .02 (11.98***) 
Shame acknowledgment na na -.42 (6.69**) 
Tax evasion na na .97 (6.61**) 
Chi-Square 191.84***   
Nagerkelke Square .49   
Sample size 440   
Overall % of correct classification  81.6%   
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001 
The variables were entered in three steps.  
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First, socio-demographic variables were included in the equation. Four out of seven of 
these variables (age, personal income, length of work, and mode of study) differentiated 
those paying upfront fees and those taking out a HECS loan. In the multivariate analysis, 
graduates were far more likely to belong to the HECS loan group if they were younger, 
had spent less time in the workforce, had studied full-time, and had lower incomes (after 
graduation). The perception of cost being a factor in choice of university course was not 
significant once the other demographic variables were included. The demographic 
indicators seemed to be more important than perceptions of cost in differentiating those 
who took out a HECS loan and those who paid their fees upfront. Altogether, this set of 
variables accounted for 37% of the variance in who carried a HECS loan and who did 
not. 
In the second step, the course satisfaction variables were entered. This time we combined 
the three significant components of course satisfaction (quality teaching, professional 
development and clear course goals) into a single composite measure. The justification 
for developing such a measure was to avoid the risk of one variable ‘competing’ to 
account for the same variance as other related variables in the multivariate analysis. The 
course satisfaction variables tended to be moderately to substantially intercorrelated 
(between .28 and .49, p < .001). In spite of taking this precautionary step, course 
satisfaction was no more likely to occur in the upfront fee-paying group than the loan 
group. The outcome at the multivariate level was different from the outcome at the 
bivariate level.  The non-significance of course satisfaction at this point in the logistic 
regression was best explained by age after some diagnostic analyses7.  At the bivariate 
                                                 
7 The logistic regression model was re-run dropping one social demographic variable at a time to find out 
which particular variable rendered course satisfaction insignificant. 
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level, the highest, and only notable correlation with dissatisfaction was with age (r = .22, 
p < .001): Younger graduates were more critical of their course than older graduates.  
In the third step, three attitudinal variables along with tax evasion were added. These 
variables explained an additional 12% of the variance in being a HECS graduate or not. 
As seen in Table 2, HECS loan graduates were more likely to evade tax, to perceive 
HECS as an unfair policy and to fear penalties should they not repay their loan 
(deterrence). Consistent with the unfairness they perceived in HECS was their lower 
likelihood of feeling shame and remorse if caught for not repaying the loan.  
The final model accounted for a total of 49% of the variance in whether graduates had 
paid upfront fees or had delayed payment by taking out a HECS loan (Nagelkerke R 
Square = .49; Chi Square = 191.81, p < .001). A total of 83% of the loan group and 80% 
of the upfront fee-paying group were correctly classified by the variables. The overall 
correct classification rate was 81%. 
These results are important, in two respects. First, it was possible to find a range of socio-
demographic indicators reflecting relative economic disadvantage that significantly 
differentiated those who took out a loan and those who paid fees upfront. The differences 
were as they should be if HECS is targeting the intended population. The HECS loan 
group was the more economically disadvantaged – they were younger, with less work 
experience, had studied full-time, and were earning less upon graduation. Second, and 
importantly, a number of attitudinal factors differentiated these groups after controlling 
for demographic and social indicators of economic disadvantage. Notably absent was 
course dissatisfaction. In contrast, a number of attitudes and behaviours were notably 
significant. These were attitudes relating to HECS - its fairness and the obligation to 
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repay the debt. What is more, not only did the HECS group feel less obligation to pay 
HECS, they were more likely to evade tax. Interestingly, these attitudes were more 
common among the HECS loan group, in spite of the fact that the HECS loan group took 
the deterrence threat associated with non-repayment seriously. Deterrence was doing 
nothing to diminish resistance to HECS and sat along side open admission to evading tax. 
Discussion and conclusion 
The significance of this study lies in its exposure of a paradox. A tertiary education loan 
scheme, designed to enable less economically advantaged students to attend university, is 
being used by its target group. Yet the scheme has not produced positive displays of 
citizenship. On the contrary, HECS appears to be cultivating resistance. Furthermore, the 
resistance is not localized to higher education. It extends to tax paying. This paper shows 
that the failure of the loan group to endorse citizenship norms associated with “doing the 
right thing” cannot be explained by a politics of envy argument. Resistance and non-
compliance endure after controls have been introduced for background variables that are 
related to opportunity and economic advantage. A substantial proportion of the problems 
created by HECS appear to be social and political, arising from dashed hopes and 
expectations for the democracy rather than personal economic disadvantage.  
HECS adopts a user-pays approach to tertiary education using the tax system as the 
regulator. If financial barriers are a deterrent to tertiary education, policymakers may like 
to consider the alternative of increasing funding to universities by raising taxes and 
avoiding the complex administrative costs and inter-generational inequities of HECS. 
Critics would respond by arguing that higher tax rates are also likely to increase tax 
evasion. Or what is more likely these days, higher tax rates will increase avoidance. Tax 
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evasion has been found consistently higher among younger people (e.g., Ahmed & 
Braithwaite, 2004), and 43% of investors in aggressive tax-planning schemes are 
graduates (Murphy & Byng, 2002). It may be that the ‘HECS generation’ is lost to the 
voluntary taxpaying culture anyway and that HECS is irrelevant. If this is the case, the 
key policy question is an economic one – whether the sum of HECS debt that the ATO 
fails to recover, the costs of HECS administration, and the costs of a 14.89% general 
increase in tax evasion by those with HECS debt (Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2004) is greater 
or smaller than the cost of increased tax evasion induced by simply increasing tax rates to 
fund higher education. If the amount is greater, HECS may not have been a constructive 
policy after all.  
However the economic analysis unfolds, there is a disturbing political implication of 
these findings that controversial policies such as HECS undermine the social fabric of the 
democratic system of governance. While ever democracies rely on citizens wanting to do 
the right thing, alarm bells should ring when government policy weakens citizen 
obligation and commitment to comply with the country’s laws. The costs of regulating a 
population that lacks obligation seem inevitably high, and the likely effectiveness of 
using coercion and surveillance seems low, particularly when the targeted group is a 
well-educated and articulate population who are better able than most to defend their 
rights and find loopholes in a system that tries to contain them. To lose cooperation of 
such a significant group seems to be costly in the short term and the long term. 
In introducing any controversial policy like HECS, policy makers should consider not 
only the monetary costs and benefits involved but also the feelings and emotions of the 
targeted population surrounding the justice of the scheme. Our research (Ahmed & 
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Braithwaite, 2005; Braithwaite & Ahmed, 2005) has shown that citizens’ perceptions and 
emotions are highly relevant to the efficient functioning of HECS and the tax system. 
Perceptions of the legitimacy of different branches of government are interconnected. If 
one branch fails to promote fair and legitimate policy, the other branches are adversely 
affected. Selznick (1992) has recognized these dangers and has called on government 
agencies to place importance on winning the hearts and minds of citizens: “The challenge 
is to maintain institutional integrity while taking into account new problems, new forces 
in the environment, new demands and expectations” (p. 336). Hence, government 
agencies need to be dynamic and flexible in responding to the social and emotional 
demands of the citizenry. They should have the capacity to reconcile constructive 
feedback and the concerns of citizens with sound economic policy (see Gibbs, 2001). 
Notwithstanding the Australian Government’s intention to design HECS in a manner that 
would bring benefits and avoid adverse economic consequences, issues surrounding the 
fairness of HECS have festered in the community and jeopardized the integrity of the tax 
system. To restore the system’s integrity, government must take a broader view. The 
social fabric will not be right just because the economic fabric is right. The social fabric 
comprises the hopes of the kind of society citizens want for themselves and their 
children. Opportunities for higher education are part of these hopes, and government is 
expected to deliver. When it does not, the social fabric is weakened, cooperation with 
government fails, and dominance and coercion become the government’s residual tools 
for managing the democracy. 
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 Appendix 
Course satisfaction: 
The quality teaching scale items: 
 (1) My lecturers were extremely good at explaining things; (2) The teaching staff of this 
course motivated me to do my best work; (3) The staff put a lot of time into commenting 
on my work; and (4) The teaching staff normally gave me helpful feedback on how I was 
going. 
The professional development scale items: 
(1) The course helped me to develop a well-defined career goal; (2) The course brought a 
sense of achievement; (3) The skills I achieved during my course are now useless 
(reverse coded); (4) The course helped me to grow professionally; (5) the course helped 
me to get the best kind of job easily; (6) The course facilitated my employment level; and 
(7) The course helped me to relate knowledge with practice. 
The clear course goals scale items: 
(1) It was often hard to discover what was expected of me in this course (reverse coded); 
and (2) It was always easy to know the standard of work expected. 
The skill acquisition scale items: 
(1) The course developed my problem-solving skills; (2) The course sharpened my 
analytic skills; (3) The course improved my skills in written communication; and (4) The 
course developed the ability to plan my own work. 
Perceived deterrence if not repaying the HECS loan: 
Deterrence = α + (C X Pt X St) + (C X Pp X Sp) ) + ε 
where α  = constant 
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 C  = likelihood of being caught 
Pt  = likelihood of having to pay the debt with interest 
St  = severity of the problem created by having to pay the debt with interest 
Pp  = likelihood of having to pay the debt with interest + penalty 
Sp  = severity of the problem created by having to pay the debt with interest + 
penalty 
ε  = disturbance (error term) 
Shame management:  
The shame acknowledgment scale items: 
(1) Feel that I had let down my family; (2) Feel ashamed of myself; (3) Feel angry with 
myself for what I did; (4) Feel concerned to put matters right and put it behind me; (5) 
Feel that what I had done was wrong; (6) Feel bad about the trouble I’d caused; (7) Feel 
humiliated; (8) Feel embarrassed; (9) Feel that I have harmed my reputation; (10) Feel 
guilty; and (11) Regret the mistakes I have made. 
The shame displacement scale items: 
(1) Feel angry with the Tax Office; (2) Feel bothered by thoughts that I was being 
unfairly treated by being given a penalty; (3) Feel that I wanted to get even with the Tax 
Office; (4) Feel like blaming the Tax Office as it failed to make me aware of my 
responsibilities; and (5) Feel like I am the victim here as I was not made aware of my 
responsibilities. 
 
 
 
